How do traders react to public information releases? How does a market structure based on voluntary liquidity provision accommodate information events? Do liquidity traders demand more compensation to provide liquidity during a process of price revision? Are the news announcements preceded or followed by information asymmetry among traders? In this research, I address these fundamental questions.
My study has two main objectives. First, I analyze the price and order flow reactions to releases of public information. Using the Reuters alerts system, I collect six months of firmspecific news for a sample of 30 highly liquid French stocks. Analyzing the trading activity around the exact disclosure times allows me to recognize the patterns of the market reaction.
Second, I develop a price formation model to investigate the components of transaction costs, namely adverse selection costs, order processing costs, and order persistence. I also estimate transaction cost components around the information disclosures.
My paper contributes to the previous literature in several aspects. In the microstructure literature, liquidity is higher immediately after the opening and immediately before the closing.
Information asymmetry among traders is one of the explanations commonly cited in these studies. My study examines another possible explanation, that is, that the intraday periods of high liquidity are associated with high rates of public information releases.
Second, how the information is incorporated in the asset prices is a central issue in finance, in particular for the concepts of market efficiency and liquidity. Market efficiency requires that information be publicly available and that prices adjust immediately to market news. My study analyzes price movements and adverse selection costs around firm-specific news release arrivals. In doing so, I provide empirical evidence on the possible existence of information asymmetry, lasting process of price adjustment, and other market frictions around information events.
Theoretically, a liquid market ensures that trades of any volume size will be executed immediately, and without price impacts. In practice, if there is severe uncertainty on asset values, market liquidity could collapse. This study shows the mechanism of liquidity provision during trading periods, as characterized by information uncertainty on asset values. The investigation of liquidity is relevant for market structures based on an open limit order book, such as the Paris Bourse and NYSE. By analyzing the order flow and transaction cost components around firm-specific news arrivals, this paper provides insights into the viability and efficiency of limit order book markets.
Finally, I propose a model for the estimation of the transaction cost components that respects price discreteness and yet is sensitive to the protracted effects of the trade process. This model extends some of the existing price formation models based on autoregressive process of the order flow, e.g., the Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans model (1997) . The estimation of transaction cost components around public information arrivals provides insight into price dynamics and traders' reactions to news disclosures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the main features of the market structure of Paris Bourse and the dataset. In Section II I briefly discuss the existing literature on news releases. Section II provides a descriptive analysis of the news impact. Section IV presents the model for the cost components measurement. Section V reports the empirical findings.
Section VI concludes. For highly traded stocks, limit order traders constantly update the limit order book (see e.g. Bias, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) ). The information in the limit order book is publicly available and disseminated worldwide. In fact, real-time information is routed towards more than 500,000 terminals.
3 44% of the submitted orders come from overseas terminal traders (Parisbourse (2000) ). Only institutional agents and investment firms, called trading members, are authorized to enter orders in the Paris Bourse System. Nevertheless, orders can also be gathered by intermediaries called order collectors, who transmit such orders to trading members.
The information in the limit order book is visible on the trading screen for each stock. The information comprises (1) the security symbol, (2) the number of shares traded since the opening, (3) the price changes between the last trade and the previous day's close, (4) number of shares exchanged, and the price and time stamp of the most recent five trades, (5) and the limit price, number of orders, cumulated order size and time stamp for the five highest bids and for the five lowest asks, respectively. The state of the order book also determines the block trade prices applying a weighed average value.
4
The tick sizes are set in four ranges. For a stock price lower than €50, the tick size is €0.01, for a stock price from 50.05 to €100 it is €0.05, for a stock price from 100.10 to €500 it is €0.1, finally, for stock prices higher than €500 it is €0.5. Table I shows the tick size of each stock in the sample. It is noteworthy that five stocks switched from one tick size to another over the sample period (see Table I ). As a stock's price crosses the pre-established threshold prices, the Paris Bourse's computer system automatically accomplishes the tick size changes.
3 The dissemination network is actually even broader than that, because real-time information is also available via Internet and Minitel. 4 To be eligible for the block trade handling, a trade must have an order size of not less than €75,000. This block trade price is the average of the best limit order prices weighted by the related order sizes. The calculation of the weighed price is based on the number of pending orders necessary to match the volume size of the block trade.
B. Database
The database provides time stamp, price, and volumes size of all trades, and time stamp, cumulated order size, and price quotes of the prevailing bid-and ask quotes 5 . Matching these data, I reconstruct the sequence of the best order changes and trade executions for a 6-month period from April to September 1999. Using the Lee and Ready's method (1990) , I infer when a trade is buyer-or seller-initiated. The matching between trade and order data allows me to reconstruct the state of the limit order book before, after and within the trades.
I analyze thirty highly traded stocks quoted on the Premier Marché, i.e., the market for large French and foreign companies with a market capitalization at least of €750 million and 25% of capital publicly available. These thirty stocks are components of the CAC40 index. For each stock, Table I reports the name, market capitalization, price change over the sample period, average daily number of trades, and average daily trading volume. This table shows that the stocks in my sample are extremely liquid. In fact, the average daily of number of trades and the daily turnover in my sample is in line with a similar NYSE sample analyzed in Venkataraman (2001) . Röell (1995) ) for the Paris Bourse, and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) for the NYSE). Table I also describes the sample of firm-specific news gathered through the alert system of the Reuters 2000 service. A user can request to the Reuters alert system to be notified on various information, such as macroeconomics news, subject-specific, or firm-specific news. I requested notification only of firm-specific news for the thirty stocks in my sample and the CAC 40 index. From April to September 1999, I recorded date, time stamp, and news headlines for a total of more than 4,900 firm-specific news releases. Two categories of firm-specific news may be recognized, namely the index-related news and the strictly firm-specific news. A release of index-related news is also treated as firm-specific news for those stocks that are index components. Since all the 30 stocks composing my sample are members of the CAC 40 index, the Reuters alert system recognizes index-related news updates also as firm-specific information releases. By activating the alert system for the CAC 40 index, I easily infer when news primarily refers to the French index. I then divide the whole news sample in two sub-samples. The former sub-sample is composed only of releases of index-related news. The latter refers to purely firmspecific news. Throughout this paper, I will refer to index-related news when the news primarily refers to the index and to strictly firm-specific news when the news primarily refers to the firm. 
II. Literature on News Releases
The market reaction to news releases has drawn much attention in the financial literature.
The link between information releases and changes in trading activity has been analyzed from many standpoints. This section is a partial and incomplete survey on the existing literature. I will only refer to those few papers closely related to my study.
The study of effects of information disclosures is a central topic in accounting literature (see Verrecchia (2001) for a survey). However, my study differs from the accounting approach in many aspects. The accounting literature is mainly interested in financial reporting disclosures (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) ). Instead, I address a broader set of firm-specific news.
My study also differs significantly from the body of the financial literature that examines the effects of macroeconomic news. See, for example, Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) , Ederington and Lee (1993), and Jain (1988) . These studies analyze the response to announcements on macroeconomic variables such as the consumer price index, industrial production, and unemployment rates. I instead study firm-specific news.
To my knowledge, the studies more closely related to my research are Berry and Howe (1994) and Patell and Wolfson (1984 Furthermore, I extend the previous literature by measuring the behavior of the transaction cost components around the news arrivals.
III. Order Flow Around News Arrivals
I now analyze the trading activity around the arrival of public news releases. I base my analysis on the average sample values of order flow components and trading activity. I decompose the trading day into ten-minute intervals. For the trading activity, I calculate price changes, return volatility, transaction volume, and intratrade time duration. Price changes are the transaction price difference between the last and first trade of each ten-minute interval. I calculate return volatility by using the method of Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001) . This method squares the log price changes and sums up the square returns over the intraday intervals.
Trading volume is the average number of shares exchanged in the ten-minute periods. The intratrade duration is the average time elapsed between the successive transactions over ten minutes. The order flow values are the order data in the book before the occurrence of the trade.
From the order data, I calculate the quoted bid-ask spread, order volume imbalance, and probability of trade continuation. As before, these measures are the average values. I measure the spread as the difference between the prevailing ask and bid quotes. The order volume imbalance is the absolute value of the difference between the volume pending at the best ask and bid. I calculate the probability of trade continuation by using the frequency of two subsequent trades in the same direction, i.e., two successive buys or sells. namely, the three periods before and the three periods after the news release arrivals.
A. Intraday Patterns of News Arrivals
The first question I address is whether the news release arrivals have an intraday seasonality and whether firm-specific news has different patterns relative index-related news. closings. In fact, much of the index-related information corresponds to a news bulletin of index reactions to earlier events, such as the Paris Bourse or NYSE openings. Firm-specific news arrivals are less affected by the intraday seasonality. However, the information flow of firmspecific news is weaker in the middle of the trading day. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that private information has a central role in the formation of moments of high liquidity. The comparison of Figure 1 and 2 suggests that liquidity peaks may also be due to flows of public information to the market.
B. Price Dynamics
In analyzing price dynamics around news arrivals, one of the main questions is whether the price reacts immediately or through a protracted process. Verrecchia (2001) shows that in terms of price reaction, the "disclosure surprise" depends on the precision of the information disclosure and, overall, on the uncertainty about the fundamental asset value. Table III provides empirical support for the existence of such a disclosure surprise. Absolute price changes around news arrivals are significantly higher than the normal values.
It is worth emphasizing that significant price movements are already observable ten minutes before the news arrival. There are two potential reasons for this. First, Reuters gathers several information sources. Hence, at the time of the Reuters announcement, the information might already be partially known. Second, some traders either trade on rumors or are better informed than others. The evidence of price movements before the news arrival time suggests that traders have heterogeneous information sets. The extraordinary price movements last until thirty minutes after the release, although their magnitude declines substantially twenty minutes after the disclosure. Patell and Wolfson (1984) find that the process of price revision lasts ten to fifteen minutes. My results suggest instead that the process of price revision lasts longer on the Paris Bourse.
The findings based on measures of price change volatility are consistent with those based on absolute price changes. The price sensitivity is a decreasing function of the precision of the public information and an increasing function of the extent of noise trading (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, (1991) ). If the noise trading were constant in the pre-and post-announcement environment, I would observe a decrease in volatility due to the higher precision of the public information. But Table III shows that return volatility is higher than the normal value from ten minutes before to at least twenty minutes after the information event. Some possible reasons are that traders trade on noise or on private information before the news release, and that traders need time to disentangle the information contents.
C. Trading Volume
The demand for immediate execution increases around public information arrivals. This evidence is observable both in terms of number of trades and transaction volume size. Table III shows that the intra-trade duration shortens suggesting a shorter time expected to be executed.
Large trading volume is a sign of heterogeneous expectations across investors (Verrecchia (2001) ), and that is due to differences in opinions, endowments and information. The evidence in Table III shows that heterogeneous beliefs characterize the trading activity even before the disclosure, suggesting that the information disclosure is at least partly expected. However, the widest market impact in terms of transaction volumes occurs within twenty minutes after the news release.
D. Liquidity Provision
Another important question is if liquidity traders shade their limit orders and weaken the liquidity provision around information uncertainty. Several statistics in Table III seem to rule out this hypothesis. The liquidity traders continue to assure a high liquidity provision even after the news disclosure. The spread size around the information arrival is smaller than the normal value. The smallest spread size indeed occurs soon after news release arrivals. This evidence suggests a high competition among limit order traders who actively overbid and undercut the best quotes, thus assuring low transaction costs to the market order traders. This evidence supports Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2001) who show that undercutting/overbidding strategy is attractive when the proportion of limit order traders is high.
Order imbalances can be used as a proxy of market depth. However, imbalances also signal the aggressiveness of one side of the market compared to the other. Parlour (1998) shows that the thickness of one side of the book strengthens (weakens) order aggressiveness in the same (opposite) side of the book. Table III shows that order imbalances increase until ten minutes after the news disclosure, and remain high. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari (2002) show that the order imbalance reflects the prevalence of one side of the market, i.e., the group of traders who believe that the asset is under-or overvalued. Handa, Schwartz and Tiwari also
show that in a competitive environment, the dominance of one group leads to a tightening of the spread. Table III support these arguments showing a smaller spread and higher order volume imbalance after public information arrivals. (1995) , who argue that traders react similarly, but successively, to the same events. The higher trade continuation is another signal that the price adjustment follows a lasting process of value revision.
E. Extreme Price Changes
Another relevant question is whether the information arrival engenders extreme price movements. The results in Table IV provide some insights to this question. Table IV shows the absolute and relative frequencies of the magnitudes of the trade-by-trade price changes in tick size. As in Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) , I divide the price change sizes in nine categories: when the price falls (jumps) four ticks or less (more), when the price goes down (up) three ticks, down (up) two ticks, down (up) one tick, and, finally, when the price remains unchanged. Interestingly, Table IV shows that the unconditional return distribution has fatter tails than it does around news arrivals. Price changes around news release arrivals are not driven by extreme price movements, but mainly by price changes from zero to two ticks. This result provides further evidence on the high liquidity provision assured by the limit order traders. The thickness of the book and the tightness of the spread guarantees narrow price changes in the price adjustment process.
Another interesting result in Table IV is that the return distribution depends significantly on the tick size range of the stock price. The occurrence of extreme price changes appears more likely when the quotation of a stock price lays within the first range of tick size, i.e. from zero to €50. This is the case for Agf, Lagardere, Michelin, Thomson, and Usinor (see Table I ). For these stocks, the frequency of extreme price changes (i.e. a price change size equal or wider than four ticks) is 14% whereas for the other three tick size ranges the probability of extreme price changes is always around 2% or 3%. The interpretation of this result is rather intriguing.
Apparently, it is not due to some distinctive characteristics of the stocks in the first tick size range. In particular, these five stocks are as much liquid as the other in the sample (see, for instance, the Percentage Quoted Spread in Table I ). A possible reason can be that traders trading in these stocks tend to submit more frequently limit orders with limit prices rounded off to five Cents. Christie and Schultz (1994) find that dealers in the NASDAQ avoid submitting odd-eighth quotes. It is possible that the cheapest stocks in the Paris Bourse are affected by a similar anomaly. As in the NASDAQ, liquidity providers may implicitly collude to maintain wide spread. However, the size of my sample and the objectives of my paper do not permit to draw conclusive considerations on this point.
IV. Price Formation Models and Cost Components Estimation
The second objective of this research is to estimate the transaction cost components. To 
The second main assumption in the MRR model is that the transaction price, t p , corresponds to the efficient price plus a component that impounds various microstructure effects:
Intuitively, φ represents the order processing cost that can be interpreted as the liquidity provider's compensation for inventory costs and clearing fees. Also, t ε denotes the i.i.d.
residual term with mean zero that embodies the effect of stochastic rounding and errors induced by price discreteness. The residual terms in Equation (1) and (2) are uncorrelated.
The third main assumption in the MRR model is that the order flow follows a general Markov chain process. To see this point, I assume that at time t, a sell occurs and thus the transaction price is at the bid. The probability of order persistence, i.e., two subsequent buys or sells, is equal to δ and the probability of reversal order is δ − 1 . In this example, the probability that the trade in 1 t + occurs at the ask and at the bid is δ − 1 and δ . Let λ represent the unconditional probability that the transaction price occurs within the spread, i.e., ( ) 
Appendix 1 shows the property of the transition matrix P. I denote
. The conditional expectation of the trade direction at time 1 t + , given the trade direction in t, is:
Combining Equation (1) and (2) clusters all the residual terms of the true and transaction prices. I note that the idea that the unexpected rather than actual order flow captures the information asymmetry expressed in Equation (1) goes back to Hasbrouck (1988 Hasbrouck ( , 1991 .
The crucial point in the MRR model is to assume that the order flow follows a Markov
Chain and to allow only a one-lag autocorrelation in the order flow. However, Hasbrouck
(1991) provides empirical evidence on lasting price and order dynamics. After comparing different models of transaction cost components, de Jong, Nijman and Röell (1996) conclude that a one-period empirical implementation underestimates the price effects of trading.
Let me assume that the order flow follows a more general autoregressive process. The
Markov Chain structure in Equation (3) implies that:
See Appendix 1 for more details. The statistical properties in Equation (6) [ ]
Where the innovation v t is a martingale difference sequence having the follows conditional expectation:
Thus, by recursive substitution, I obtain that the trade initiation process and express it as:
where
. Consistent with the Wold decomposition theorem (Hamilton (1995), pp. 108-9), the term v may also be seen as a white noise representing the error made in forecasting t x on the basis of a linear function of lagged t x :
According to Equation (6) and the successive discussion above, I can generalize the MRR model's expression of true price process in Equation (5) in this way:
To find a straightforward representation of the estimation equation, I limit the autoregressive decaying impact of the order flow to two lags. This assumption is consistent with the previous findings in the literature that the significant level in the auto-regressive process of the trade indicator series achieves two or, at maximum, three, lags. Equation (5) clusters all the residual terms of the true price and the transaction price. The constant α represents the expected change in the asset value. The AR representation makes the price formation process more robust for many microstructure imperfections that engender lagged effects. In fact, the literature provides evidence on price discreteness effects (e.g., Harris (1994) ), inventory consequences (e.g., Stoll (1989) ), lasting adjustments to information (e.g., Patell and Wolfson (1984) ), and other strategic behaviors effects, such as the splitting strategy that induces dilutions in the price impacts or price smoothing effects.
I estimate the AR price formation model by applying the ordered probit model. Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992) propose this technique for analyzing the price change dynamics, but not for measuring transaction cost components. As described above, I rank the price changes in nine intervals containing the entire possible price change sizes. 
V. Empirical Findings on Transaction Costs

A. Transaction Cost Components in the Paris Bourse
The estimates in Table VI provide evidence on the existence of adverse selection cost, order processing cost, and order persistence in limit order book markets 6 . The order processing cost is the largest cost component. Adverse selection and the autocorrelation components are smaller, but significant.
The AR model provides estimates of transaction cost components consistent with the literature (e.g. Stoll (1989) ; Declerck (2000); de Jong, Nijman, and Röell (1996); and Huang and Stoll (1997) ). Table IV shows the main statistics of the ordered probit regression and confirms the significance of the first and second lags in the order flow. Table VI 
B. Correlation between Cost Components and Liquidity Proxies
The main question I address in this section is how cost components, number of news releases, and market liquidity are related. The number of firm-specific news releases and proxies for stock liquidity are positively correlated. In Table VII , the correlations between the number of news releases and market capitalization and the number of daily trades and percentage quoted spread are, respectively, 0.74, 0.70, and -0.54. This evidence is consistent with previous findings of a positive link between market capitalization and information flow through different sources, such as press and analysts (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) ).
The correlation between market liquidity and the estimates of the adverse selection cost is negative. The higher information availability makes easier and more transparent the valuation of larger companies. Other studies support this argument. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) use the number of analysts following the stock as a proxy for the supply of information about firm. They find that greater analyst coverage tends to reduce adverse selection costs. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that investment opportunities constitute the chance for exploiting private information. They show that managers of high growth firms have superior knowledge about the firm's investment opportunity set.
The correlation between order processing costs and liquidity proxies is positive. I would expect a negative linkage at least for two reasons. First, if economies of scale matter in determining transaction costs, then I expect to observe smaller trading costs in high liquid stocks. Second, more liquid stocks attract discretionary liquidity traders, since these traders can share the asymmetric information risk. This mechanism enhances the competitiveness in providing liquidity and thereby reduces the order processing cost. However, the correlation statistics in Table VII do not support these arguments. In fact, the order processing cost estimates are positively associated with liquidity.
The AR model suggests that order autocorrelation is higher for the most liquid stocks.
This result supports the idea that the higher trade frequency of more liquid stocks drives a higher degree of order persistence. Empirical evidence in Huang and Stoll (1997) supports these findings.
C. Transaction Cost Components and News Arrivals
The estimation of the cost components around public information arrivals provides straightforward proxies of the adverse selection cost, order processing cost, and autocorrelation components over intraday periods characterized by uncertainty on the asset values. Table VI shows the estimates of the cost components conditional on information events. Using piecewise dummy variables, I estimate the transaction cost components in six ten-minute time intervals around the public information arrivals. Equation (11) is transformed as follows:
where j=1,…6 refers to the ten-minute interval around the news arrival and d j refers to the piecewise dummy variable for the j time interval.
The conditional analysis of the cost components coming from regression (13) is relevant to recognizing the role of adverse selection costs, order processing costs, and order persistence around information disclosures. The estimation of the cost components allows us to address the following questions. First, does the pre-announcement trading is characterized by higher adverse selection costs due to information asymmetry? Does the high liquidity provision immediately after the news arrival increase the competitiveness in providing liquidity and thereby decrease the order processing costs? Does the release of a public information produce the persistence of trading in one direction?
The first indication from Table VI is that the adverse selection costs around information releases are generally lower than the normal value. This evidence suggests a lower risk of information asymmetry. There is no clear indication on which time interval around the news arrival adverse selection costs best characterizes the trading. However, the results suggest that the highest adverse selection costs occur before the news release. This finding appears to be consistent with the significant price and volume movements preceding the information disclosure reported in Table III. The order processing costs around public information arrivals are lower than the normal values. These estimates are consistent with the descriptive analysis in Table III showing that the disclosure impact is not due to a lack of liquidity. In fact, the higher competitiveness in providing liquidity around the public information arrival suggests smaller order processing costs. Order processing costs tend to decrease from the pre-announcement to postannouncement trading. This evidence further supports the idea that the competitiveness in providing liquidity brings to tighter compensation for limit order traders.
Finally, Table VI shows that the release of a public information produces the persistence of trading in one direction This finding is consistent with the results in Table III showing a higher probability of trade continuation around news releases.
VI. Conclusions
My research provides a descriptive analysis of the market behavior around the news release arrivals. Second, it investigates the transaction cost components around the public information arrivals. Using the Reuters alert system, I collect six months of firm-specific news for thirty highly liquid stocks quoted on the Paris Bourse. Matching the news releases with the data of the intraday trading activity, I analyze the market behavior around disclosure time.
The main results are as follows. First, the market responds to news release arrivals by supplying a significant extent of liquidity. In fact, the spread is very tight and the limit order book is thick. However, order imbalance, trade frequency, and spread tightness are highest immediately before and after the news release arrivals.
Second, the disclosure impact begins ten minutes before the Reuters news releases and lasts for at least thirty minutes. I analyze several possible explanations for the premature market movements. Among other arguments, I discuss the existence of rumors and private information, and the availability of many information sources. The volume impact is highest from ten to twenty minutes after the news arrivals. The behavior of trading volume provides further evidence on the existence of heterogeneous beliefs and interpretations about the information contents and asset values.
Third, this paper shows the characteristics of the transaction cost components in limit order book markets. The order processing cost is the largest cost component. Adverse selection and the autocorrelation components are smaller but significant. Also, adverse selection costs decrease with market liquidity and the rate of public information arrivals.
Finally, I analyze the behavior of the cost components around the public information disclosure. The adverse selection cost component appears lower than normal. This evidence suggests that asymmetric information have a weak relevance in the disclosure impact. However, the magnitude of the adverse selection is slightly higher before, rather than after, the news release arrivals. I interpret this evidence as a reduction of information asymmetry from the prenews to the post-news environment. Order processing costs are also smaller around news release arrivals. This result provides further evidence on the high degree of competitiveness in the liquidity supply.
Appendix 1: Specifications for the AR model
The occupancy probability matrix at time t of the transition matrix t P has the property 
The covariance in (A.2) and the correlation in (A.3) can be also expressed as:
Accordingly, the lagged covariance and correlation are: Table I : Description of the Sample. For each stock, the table shows company name (in "Name" column), market capitalization ("MktCap"), price change over the sample period from April to September 1999 ("DP"), average daily number of trades ("Daily Trades"), average trade size in number of shares ("Volume"), average transaction price in € ("Price"), quoted spread as the difference between the askand bid-quotes ("Quoted Spread"), and percentage quoted spread (quoted spread divided by the midquote price) ("PQS"). The table also reports the total number of firm-specific news releases by the Reuters news alert system (in "All News" column). The total number of news is the sum of the news that are strictly firm-specific ("Firm News") and index-related news ("Index News"). The index-related news primarily refers to the CAC 40 index. The Paris Bourse has four tick size ranges. The "Tick Range" column shows within which tick size range stocks are quoted.
Name
MktCap The table reports the absolute values of the price change from the beginning and the end of the time interval ("Abs DP"), the return volatility as the sum of squared price changes over the time interval ("Volatility"), the average volume in number of shares traded over the time interval ("Volume"), the order volume imbalance as the average absolute value of the difference between the order volume pending at the best bid and ask quotes ("Imbalance"), the average time in seconds that elapses between successive transactions ("Trade Wait"), the quoted spread as the difference between the best bid and ask quotes ("Spread"), and the probability of trade continuation as the frequencies that two successive trades have the same direction ("Cont."). The last column ("Nbr of Obs ") on the right side shows the total number of observations. Panel A shows the unconditional values, i.e., values over the entire sample period. Panel B shows the market reaction to all public information releases. Panel C shows the impact of news that is strictly firm specific, i.e., I do not include index-related news. In Panels B and C, I analyze the market reaction over six 10-minute time intervals, from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the news releases. I calculate the student's t-test to test a significant difference between sample averages and the chi-test to test a significant difference between sample volatilities. * means a significance level at 5%. The table columns show estimates for adverse selection cost ("ASC"), order processing cost ("OPC"), and order persistence ("PERS"). The liquidity proxies are market capitalization ("Mkt Cap"), average daily number of trades ("N. Trades"), and the percentage quoted spread ("PQS"). The number of news releases ("News Arrivals") is the total number of firmspecific news released by the Reuters alert system. 
